The Mixed Effects of Advanced Cockpit Systems on Pilot Performance

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Multiple systems in the advanced cockpit (not just glass displays).

We studied the effects of several on pilot performance, individually.

How does each system affect:

Pilot Error Workload Awareness



How do pilots think advanced cockpit systems affect them?

Found that each system is unique: each introduces advantages and disadvantages ... and that pilots are not always aware of them.



GPS



Pilot Error

GPS (Like VOR) Requires Mastery of Procedures

Practice "made perfect" ... when procedures were supported by visual cues on the interface.

Problems persisted when procedures required rote memorization of steps.

MOST CONCERNING:

Not knowing what to do next ...



GPS


Pilot Error

Logic and Modes Can Be Confusing

MOST CONCERNING:

Sourcing errors

Persistant ...



Pilots seemed to have a general awareness of these issues.

Compared to VOR, pilots committed fewer errors during some phases of flight (missed approach), and more errors during others (initial setup, approach).



GPS

Workload

Workload lower during predictable stretches ...

... and higher when (re)configuration of the unit was needed.

No overall difference between VOR and GPS.




GPS with MOVING MAP



Some benefits are readily apparent.

GPS with MOVING MAP


Navigational Awareness



VORs and ADFs make pilots build pictures in their heads.



Navigational Awareness



Pilots don't seem to build pictures in their heads when using GPS and maps.

Is "in the cockpit" as good as "in the head"?

MOST CONCERNING:

When the GPS and map become inoperative Navigation skill atrophy or extinction Pilots seem less aware of the effects on awareness



ELECTRONIC FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS





No difference in errors (altitude, course, or speed excursions) or reported workload after some initial practice.



CONCLUSIONS

Advanced cockpit systems introduce advantages and disadvantages.

Our results pointed to the computers more than the displays.

Some mismatch between pilot beliefs and measure effects.

Pilots state an overwhelming preference for using advanced cockpit systems.



Moving Forward:

- Interface Design: visible cues, simple mental models, make "wrong" look wrong.
- Particular attention to route modifications and transitions (modes).
- Re-engaging the pilot: Do we have to automate everything?
- Develop error procedures and error training.
- Raising awareness of automation effects.



Moving Forward (cont.):

• Continue the accident analyses to isolate the effects of specific cockpit systems.

"Glass" vs. "conventional" compares airplanes that are probably more similar than they are different:







Moving Forward (cont.):

• Accident reports could benefit from more details about equipment installed.



A TEMPLATE?

Navigation: VOR GPS BOTH

Autopilot: Y N

Moving Map: Y N

Cockpit Weather: Y N

Elec. Flt. Instr.: Y N

Traffic Alerting: Y N

Terrain Display: Y N

• Flight data recording (including button presses and knob twists) will provide details about equipment *in use*.



MORE INFORMATION:

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